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The aim of this paper is to analyze the trend of poverty and income distribution in Chile 
in the last seventeen years, that is since 1989, when elections allowed a coalition named 
Concertación and driven by Patricio Aylwin to guide the country and to put an end to 
Augusto Pinochet’s government, which lasted 16 years, from 1973 to 1989.  
The reforms that Pinochet’s government brought about on the basis of the liberalist 
theories and realized with the aim to accelerate the country’s modernization process, 
certainly helped the economic growth, but even caused some persistent repercussions 
on both income distribution and poverty.   
The very nature of the fields of these reforms suggests the hypothesis that they could 
have affected the income distribution structure and, consequently, the poverty rate of 
population.  
The paper is structured on three sections: in the first, introductory, one, we briefly 
showed the main aspects of the social security system and the labour market reforms 
that Pinochet’s government carried out; in the second one, we presented an analysis of 
the trends of population and employment, to verify the basic conditions on which the 
governments of the Concertación intervened since 1989; and in the last one, we 
examined the poverty and income distribution trends.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the trend of poverty and income distribution in Chile 
in the last seventeen years, that is since 1989, when elections allowed a coalition named 
Concertación and driven by Patricio Aylwin to guide the country and to put an end to 
Augusto Pinochet’s government, which lasted 16 years, from 1973 to 1989. 
To better comprehend the present economic situation of Chile, we will study the context 
that President Aylwin inherited from the former government.  
The reforms that Pinochet’s government brought about on the basis of the liberalist 
theories and realized with the aim to accelerate the country’s modernization process, 
certainly helped the economic growth, but even caused some persistent repercussions 
on both income distribution and poverty.   
The paper is structured on three sections: in the first, introductory, one, we briefly 
showed the main aspects of the social security system and the labour market reforms 
that Pinochet’s government carried out; in the second one, we presented an analysis of 
the trends of population and employment, to verify the basic conditions on which the 
governments of the Concertación intervened since 1989; and the last one, will examine 
poverty and income distribution trends.  
The purpose of this paper is to verify, macroeconomically speaking, the effects of the 
reforms brought about by the Pinochet’s government (1973-1989), by trying to single 
out the influences they exerted on the economy not only on the short run, but even on 
the long one, or until our days. 
The first section of the paper is focused on the analysis of the economic reforms.  
As the new government entered upon office, new important changes were applied to the 
labour market structure and to the pension system. 
The very nature of the fields of these reforms suggests the hypothesis that they could 
have affected the income distribution structure and, consequently, the poverty rate of 
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2.  The labour market reform 
 
The frameworks on which the Pinochet’s government intervened were various. First of 
all, the labour market, which was deeply deregulated with the aim to expedite the 
production structure and to make it more competitive. This purpose was supported by 
several liberalization programmes. 
The Chilean liberalist model was based on two pillars: on the one hand, the virtually 
unlimited access to the natural resources and on the other hand a flexible and cheap 
labour force. Ex post, the reforms didn’t convince all the economists, even because, as 
Morgado asserts, laws in force since 1973 were quite able to guarantee the labour 
market efficiency
1. Anyway, the reform was carried out, it was very thorough and it 
concerned both the individual work relationships (with regard to the admittance to the 
labour market, to the working conditions and to the dismissals), and the collective ones 
(in terms of the trade-unions freedom, of collective bargaining and the right to strike). 
 
As regards the first issue, we highlight that the new law on the admittance of the labour 
market had two distinguishing characteristics: it was aimed to facilitate the short-term 
bargaining, freeing the employers from an inseparable commitment with the employee 
and it arranged a legislative framework in which was modified the bargaining with 
particular categories of workers (like minors or apprentices, derogating from the duty of 
establishing that a part of the minors’ working day should be reserved to the study). 
Moreover, night-work was authorized even for the children under sixteen who were 
employed in the industrial sector. 
On the subject of the working conditions, according to the government’s renewal 
programme, an higher flexibility degree would have helped the hoped economic growth 
process. 
 
The manoeuvre intervened on several variables, like the working time (exceptions to the 
right to rest during Sunday and holidays of obligation increased and employers were 
allowed to prolong the working hours to 10), wages (laws concerning the minimum 
wages were abrogated and, since 1973, the government directly intervened in the 
process of wages bargaining, decreeing the wages’ increases both in the public and in 
the private sector
2) and vacations (were abrogated the preceding laws, which provided 
longer vacations for the ones who worked in the farest regions of the country or in the 
mineral deposits).  
                                                 
1 E. Morgado,” Las reformas laborales y su impacto en el funcionamento del mercado del trabajo 
en Chile”, CEPAL, Serie Reformas Económicas n. 32, luglio 1999.  
2 A. Mizala – P. Romanguera “La legislación laboral y el mercado del trabajo en Chile : 1975 – 
2000”, in R. Ffrench-Davis – B. Stallings “Reformas, crecimiento y politicas sociales en Chile desde 
1973”, LOM Ediciones, novembre 2001.   4
The new laws allowed employers to modify unilaterally the working conditions, 
exercising a right called ius variandi, which application field was particularly relevant for 
the working place or the working time, for instance advancing the working time or 
prolonging the working day with an extra hour. 
The working term ad nutum was restored so to give the employer the chance to dismiss 
the employees without a lawful reason. With the aim to interrupt the working relation, 
the only duty for the employer was an upon notice to the worker or, at his choice, the 
payment of a severance. Among the dismissal reasons, even political issues were 
included.  
 
Since from the start, severe restrictions were imposed to the trade-union action, 
through the revocation of the legal status of the unions, the interruption in advance of 
the union assignments and the significant limitations to the freedom to form or to join 
an union and to the opportunity to finance all the trade-union activities.  
Since 1979, a new course began: the government tried to smooth over some rigidities 
that belonged to the system it founded, for example with regard to the trade-union 
actions, whose every single mechanism was ruled.  
In 1973 the previous legislation on the collective barganing agreements was suppressed 
and, on the contrary, the individual one was strongly encouraged by the government, 
due to the higher flexibility that it could involve. 
Only in 1979 the collective bargaining agreement was re-established, but it was only in 
every single firm, while the possibility to open the collective bargaining to the production 
division was denied.  
With regard to the right to strike, the previous legislation was deeply modified. In force 
since 1932, it allowed the unlimited strike and it prohibited the employers to substitute 
the striking workers. 
 
In the framework of the reforms the government carried out in the subject of the labour 
market, we can distinguish two phases: the first one from 1973 to 1978 and the second 
one from 1979 to 1983. 
The first one is the most rigid one. The subtle control of the political power of the 
unionists (which was carried on even if the rules weren’t modified)
3 was supported by 
the suppression of the labour courts and, with the law enacted by decree 43/1973, the 
suspension of the right to strike. In 1978, the law enacted by decree 2 200 established 
that the employer could dismiss without a fair reason. The only duty, for him, would be 
to correspond an amount of money equivalent to the wage of 1 month  for each year of 
work the dismissed worker remained into the firm.  
                                                 
3 P. Gonzales, 1996.   5
During the second period, which started in 1979, the government partially modified the 
character of some of the previous initiatives. So, it implemented the “Labour Plan”, 
which reintroduced the collective bargaining, the trade-union activity and the right to 
strike. Anyway, the new law deterred the right to strike, by subjecting it to several 
conditions: among the others, the one that established that it could be revoked if it 
wasn’t joined by the half plus one of the workers. 
The duration of the strike was limited to 60 days, after which the contracts would be 
automatically interrupted and the involved workers would have lost their right to ask for 
their retirement bonds.  
Furthermore, it was allowed the temporary substitution of the striking workers. After 
1982, with the law 18618 (which modified the law enacted by decree 2 200/1978), the 
maximum amount a dismissed worker could perceive was reduced to a 5 months’ wage
4. 
 
The social costs of the reforms enforced during the Pinochet’s government were mainly 
due to the precarization of the working conditions, which became almost exclusively 
individual. 
Thanks to a legal machinery which was all to the employers’ advantage, the incidence of 
the classic working relations decreased, while increased the atypical contracts, like the 
temporary jobs and the indirect bargaining (outsourcing, interinal work). 
At the same time, new kinds of work (like domestic working and part-time jobs) became 
important. 
These structural changes involved an increasing instability in the working relations, 
whose nature and localization became more and more vague. The negative impact of the 
economic crisis of 1975 and 1982 and the new labour policies, not only raised the 
unemployment rate, but even caused differences in the working relations, due to the 
necessity, for the workers, not to lose their jobs. 
This framework suggests that the policies conceived to satisfy the answer for flexibility 
that comes from the market shouldn’t affect the labour institutions to the point that they 









                                                 
4 C. E. Montenegro, 2000.   6
3. The pension reform 
 
In line with the labour market reform programme, the government carried out a pension 
reform based on the streamlining of bureaucracy, the procedures and, most of all, the 
expenses chargeable to the State. 
The new pension system passed through a privatization which involved a complete 
reversal of the pre-existent laws. 
Since 1920, indeed, Chile developed one of the most advanced social welfare system in 
Latin America, based on the co-partnership of the three involved agents: the workers, 
the employers and the State. Even if the pension amount depended on the wage level, 
the system accomplished its income redistribution role through two ways: by draining 
the income from the richest workers to the poorest ones (so that they could perceive a 
pension which was higher than the one they worked for) and by an overlapping 
generation income transfer, since the deductions from wages contributed to determine 
the pension funds of the retired ones. 
 
In the previous Pay-as-you-go pension system, the pensions were divided into: 
retirement pension; old age pension; disability pension; survivorship pension; minimum 
pension guaranteed by the State. The retirement pension was based on a monthly, 
permanent and for life pension, which allowed the advance retirement. Its potential 
beneficiaries were those contributors who worked for 35 years on the 9
th February 1979, 
apart from their age. 
The old age pension was a monthly, permanent and for life pension which was granted 
to the 55 or 60 years old workers (respectively depending on if they were male or 
female) who paid their contributions for a minimum of pre-established weeks or years.  
The disability pension was a monthly pension for those workers who were seriously 
injured while they were working. 
The survivorship pension was provided for two different kind of beneficiaries: the 
defunct’s children and the consort. If the consort was a male, he could benefit from this 
pension only if he was disabled and if he was dependent on his dead wife. 
The minimum pension guaranteed by the State was based on the role the State played 
in the old system, where, besides managing and paying the pensions, he had the 
function to grant a minimum pension which was given any time that, after the pension 
estimate, its amount was lower than an established minimum.  
This social security system concerned, in 1973, more than the 75% of the Chilean 
workers. 
 
As we said before, the government strongly intervened on the previous system, 
beginning in 1979 by elevating the retirement age and the contribution rate. In 1980,   7
with the law enacted by decree 3 500, it started up the pension system reform which 
would have been carried out through the transition from the public system to the private 
one, based on the compulsory individual capitalization and on a precise contribution 
scheme
5. That reform was founded on the will to finish the retirement pensions and to 
redefine them on the basis of the real remuneration perceived during the entire 
beneficiary’s life (and no more on the ones perceived on the last working years).  
 
The law enacted by decree 3 500 reorganized the old Pay-as-you-go system into a single 
pension institution, the INP (Instituto de Normalización Previsional). It also created 
apposite private institutions which attended to the pension fund managing: the Pension 
Fund Administrators, or AFP (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones), which are public 
corporations. Existing workers were allowed to choose the system in which they would 
remain and, in order to recognize the contributions they made into the previous system, 
workers who transferred to the new one were issued “Recognition Bonds”, which 
complemented the individual’s account balance and were liquidated at the time of 
retirement. The system established a minimum monthly contribution equivalent to the 
10% of the salary, which the salaried workers should deposit into an individual 
capitalization account managed by the AFPs, while self-employed individuals could 
participate voluntarily. Since the 25% of the workers are self-employed, only the 2% of 
the monthly contributions into the AFPs funds came from the self-employed individuals.  
In the meanwhile, the employer was raised from the payment of his own share of 
contribution, which varied from 12% to 15% and which was transferred to the 
employees through an apposite correction of wages. 
 
Since 1982, workers who entered the labour market for the first time were mandated to 
participate in the new system. In 2003, less than the 5% of the workers were still 
participating in the old pension system. 
The exemption of the employers from the duty of paying the contribution to their 
employees was inspired by the intention of making the Chilean productive system more 
competitive both on the inside market and on the international one. 
With the reform and the new pension system, the old age pension, the advance old age 
pension, the disability pension, the survivorship pension and the minimum pension 
guaranteed by the State were reintroduced. 
A more detailed analysis will help to comprehend the main differences with respect to 
the previous system.  
The retirement pension, as before, allowed even to the AFP affiliates to obtain the 
pension once they reached the retirement age.  
                                                 
5 R. Ffrench-Davis – B. Stallings, 2001.   8
With the early retirement pension, the government introduced the right for the worker 
to have a pension before the retirement age. The contributor could both obtain a 
pension that was equivalent or greater than the 50% of the average income perceived 
during the last 10 years of work or obtain a pension equal or greater than the 110% of 
the minimum pension established by law, equivalent to 102US$ for pensioners under 70 
years of age.  
For what concerns the disability pension, even in this case was retained the previous 
system’s statement and the government provided a monthly pension for the workers to 
whom the Medical Commission of the AFP recognized a disability occurred during their 
working time. Those entitled to obtain this benefit are the non-pensioned affiliates who 
are below the legal retiring age and who have sustained the loss of at least the 2/3 of 
their ability to work (in this case, they have the right to a total disability pension). If 
they sustained a loss of ability to work which is over the 50% and under the 2/3, he has 
the right to a partial disability pension. After three years from the judgement issue, the 
health condition of the affiliate would have been further ascertained by the Medical 
Commission, in order to give him the right to the definitive disability pension.  
The survivorship pension was directed, as it was in the previous system, to the surviving 
beneficiaries on the death of the member. 
For what concerns the minimum pension guaranteed by the State, the law enacted by 
decree 3 500 established that no pension could correspond to less than a 70% of the 
last perceived wage. If, at the moment of retirement or while already retired, the 
affiliate couldn’t afford to cover the minimum pension, the State promises to finance the 
remainder. So, the guarantee of a minimum pension was confirmed in two ways: with 
an old age minimum pension, conceived to the workers who paid their contribution for 
20 years in any social security system and with a maximum of three years of 
unemployment pension and the disability or the survivorship pension for the injured 
workers or for the dead worker’s relatives. This last pension was subjected to one 
condition: it would have been paid only if the workers paid the contribution for 10 years 
or if they paid the contribution for 2 years during the 5 years before the accident, or if 
they were paying the contribution during the disability declaration or, finally, if they 
were retired at the moment of their decease (for the survivorship pension)
6. 
 
The government guarantees a minimum level of pension that currently is equivalent to 
an amount of 77,077 Chilean pesos per month, which corresponds to the 27% of the 
average wage in the economy and the 65% of the minimum monthly wage. 
 
                                                 
6 F. Bertranou – A. Arenas de Mesa, 2003.   9
The government laid the legal bases for the shift to the new privatized social security 
system, by establishing that all the new workers should open their personal accounts 
into the new private companies and it introduced various privileges for the already 
employed ones who decided to join it. 
One of the main provided benefits was the recognition bonus, a financial tool calculated 
on the basis of the number of the years of contribution paid in the old social security 
system. The corresponding funds were transferred on the individual accounts at the end 
of the working relation (now they represent the 50-70% of the policy holders’ accrued 
funds). All the contributions went into a pension fund invested in the financial market by 
the AFPs. The returns of these investments were accrued in the individual accounts of 
each contributor. 
At the moment of the retirement, the workers could choose between two different 
options: to withdraw the accrued money from their individual accounts, by perceiving a 
monthly amount annually calculated on their life expectancy and on the remaining 
amount on their accounts, or to prefer an yearly income guaranteed by an insurance 
company.  
In this second case, the pension monthly perceived would have been lower than the one 
perceived with the programmed withdrawal, but in this way the risk that the due amount 
was decimated by the market fluctuations was at least partially eliminated. 
This choice possibility was particularly important, since it was established that the 
workers couldn’t have the chance to affect the  investment policies of the AFP to whom 
they paid their contributions, even if they were risky. 
Each worker’s pension profile would have been formulated on the basis of several 
variables: the paid contributions, the return of the investments made with the pension 
fund, the recognition bonds and its fixed real revenue rate, the voluntary additional 
savings of the affiliates, the  benefit that the government paid in order to grant a 
minimum pension fixed by law and finally the actuarial factors (life expectancy), 
calculated on the gender. 
 
The pension system was planned so to be based on the public sector for all the non-
contributive, redistributive and welfare functions, even if the revenues used to finance 
the public expenditures weren’t never suitable to the real needs, since there was neither 
an apposite tax. 
With the law enacted by decree 3 500, which set up the new system, the then Minister 
of Work Josè Piñera affirmed that the repercussions of the reforms on the coffers of the 
State would have been of no value. 
 
The truth is that the costs that the government bore were significant and even higher 
than what’s provided. The main expenditure item that the State had to face, even   10
considering the impoverishment of the available revenues due to the reduction of the 
numbers of contributors was the payment of the pensions to the ones who decided to 
remain into the old system. In the second place, the State
7. Since 1974 to 1980, to 
maintain the public pension system, it was necessary to use the 2,4% of the GDP.  
The new pension system incorporated all the subordinate workers (included the 
agricultural workers, the domestic workers and the ones employed in the micro 
enterprises), while the self-employed workers were allowed to join voluntarily. 
In the months subsequent to the reform, almost 1.1 million contributors (equivalent to 
the 70%) chose the new system.  
 
The evolution of the occupational coverage
8 and of the privatized system’s effective 
coverage
9, during the Pinochet’s government, can be appreciated by reading the table 1.  
The old public system’s coverage constantly increased and, in 1975, reached the 71.2%. 
After the reform, the adhesion slowly started  decreasing and they increasde again in 
1987 to the 61,6%. 
The causes of the progressive diminution of the coverage should be found in the 
intervened changes of the system, even after the measures taken, which brought to the 
unemployment’s increase and to the enlarging of the informal employment. 
 
Table 1 
ANNO  OCCUPATIONAL COVERAGE  EFFECTIVE COVERAGE  
 APF  INP  TOTAL  AFP    INP  TOTAL 
1975  - 71,2  71,2  - 61,9 61,9 
1976  - 65,7  65,7  - 57,3 57,3 
1977  - 62,2  62,2  - 54,8 54,8 
1978  - 56,6  56,6  - 48,5 48,5 
1979  - 56,2  56,2  - 48,5 48,5 
1980  - 53,3  53,3  - 47,8 47,8 
1981  n.d. 18,4  n.d.  n.d. 16,3  n.d. 
1982  36,0  16,6 52,6 29,0  13,4  42,3 
1983  38,2  14,9 53,1 33,5  13,0  46,6 
1984  40,6 13,7  543  35,0 11,8  46,8 
1985  44,0  12,8 56,9 38,8  11,3  50,1 
1986  45,9  11,6 57,5 41,1  10,4  51,6 
1987  50,6  11,0 61,6 45,7  10,0  55,7 
1988  50,6 9,8  60,4 46,6 9,0  55,6 
1989  50,8 8,7  59,5 47,2 8,1  55,3 
Source: Our elaboration on data INP (Instituto Nacional de Pensiones). 
 
As regards the effective coverage, this showed a decreasing trend until 1982, since 
when occurred a reversal of trend, which lead to a steady increase. 
                                                 
7 J. Lear – J. Collins, “Retiring on the free market: Chile’s privatized social security, 20 years 
after”, CENDA, 2001. 
8 La copertura occupazionale è data dal rapporto tra contribuenti ed occupati. 
9 La copertura effettiva è determinata dal rapporto tra contribuenti e forza lavoro.   11
Since when the system was introduced, the number of the persons who joined the AFP 
grew until the 6 millions in 2000, virtually corresponding to the whole of the 
economically active population. 
Among them, about the 44% regularly pay their contributions, while the remaining 56% 
can hardly reach a total of 240 monthly payments which would allow them to perceive 
the minimum pension guaranteed by the State. So, they only preserve their right to 
draw the money they amassed.  
The fact that the 56% of the Chilean can only occasionally pay their contributions largely 
depends on the Chilean occupational structure, which is strongly affected by the 
temporary nature of the seasonal and informal job.  
Indeed, some of the traditional Chilean industries – like the agricultural, ichthyic or 
minino ones – need seasonal workers, while the manufacturing industry is characterized 
by a very flexible demand for labour
10. 
The facts show that, 20 years after the new system’s introduction, despite the high 
returns of the invested revenues, many contributors earmarked funds which will hardly 
allow them to a dignified pension
11. A social system based only on the individual ability 
in making money tends to reproduce the social and labour market imbalances
12. 
 
Which is the real amount of the revenues that the societies hoarded until now? 
Between 1981 and 1999, the pension funds amounted at 34 million dollars 
(approximately the 53% of GDP), with an average real annual return rate equivalent to 
the 11%. 
Anyway, if we want to evacuate the new system, we ought to consider that this value is 
strongly influenced by the fact that, until now, against an increasing number of 
contributors, retirements are still quite scarce and the expenditure items corresponding 
to the retirement liquidation are lower than the earnings deriving from the subscriptions 
and from the respective contributions. In fact, both in 1995 and in 1998, the return rate 
of the AFP showed negative results: respectively, the -2,5% and the -1.1%.  
And, according to several Chileans, the system revealed itself to be most problematic 
than what’s provided: many workers are not able to deposit an amount which is 
sufficient to apply for the minimum pension, while others risk their pension to be 
decimated by the sudden stock exchange recessions
13. Actually, the new privatized 
                                                 
10 A. Arenas de Mesa “El sistema de pensiones en Chile:resultados y desafios pendientes”, 
http://www.redsegsoc.org.uy/1%20Arenas_Chile. htm 
11 A. Arenas de Mesa, “Cobertura previsional en Chile: lecciones y desafíos del sistema de 
pensiones administrado por el sector privado”, Serie Financiamento del desarrollo n.105, CEPAL - 
UN, Santiago de Chile, 2000. 
12 A. Uthoff, “Mercado de Trabajo y sistema de pensiones”, CEPAL, Revista de la CEPAL n. 78, 
diciembre 2003. 
13 Occorre ricordare che le AFP godono di un’assoluta autonomia nella gestione dei fondi depositati 
dai contribuenti e che questi ultimi non possono esercitare un diritto di intervento sulle attività 
intraprese da tali società.   12
system is not optional or supplementary: it represents the only possible contribution 
form for the majority of the labour force.  
 
In the individual capitalization pension system, according to what emerged in the 
Chilean case, there could be some inequalities. First of all, a low coverage of the system, 
surely deriving from some structural elements, such the unemployment growth and the 
increase of self-employment and informal jobs (and the possibility to perceive a 
minimum pension from the State, which tends to discourage, somehow, the workers to 
contribute to the system).  
In the second place, the public expenditure increased. The passing from the old system 
to the new one needed the transition costs related to the payments due to the ones who 
paid their contributions in the previous system and the payment of the recognition 
bonds to those contributors who decided to join the new system. Without any doubt, 
those costs were computed under optimistic hypothesis about the coverage and 
formalization level, which didn’t actually realize. Instead, it occurred a reduction of the 
coverage, which involved the growth of the expenditures of the assistential pensions and 
for the minimum pensions. In 2000, the whole of these expenditures amounted to the 
5.7% of the GDP, representing the 42% of the government’s social expenditure and the 
27% of the entire expenditure
14. 
 
A further observation concerns the high administrative costs. Indeed, one of the most 
important arguments in favour of the reform was the supposed managing superiority of 
the private sector with respect to the public one. According to many expectations, the 
privatization would have increased the system’s efficiency and reduced the respective 
costs. However, the Chilean experience demonstrates that privatization didn’t get the 
hped results. This happened because, on the one hand, the State monopoly granted 
enormous economy scales on factors such the takings machines, the pension payments 
and the judiciary issues, and even because the hard competition among the various 
funds and the freedom to choice and to pass from one AFP to another, increases the 
number of the ones who pass through different AFPs. According to a survey made in 
1995, the 44% of the workers changed his AFP during the same year; this increases the 
costs that fall upon the same contributor
15. In fact, in addition to the fixed quota of the 
10% paid into the pension funds, the contributors even pay the 2,34% more for the 
fund administration and the 0.7% for the bargaining of the disability or life insurances. 
                                                 
14 A. Uthoff, “La reforma del sistema de peniones en Chile: desafios pendientes”, CEPAL, Serie 
Financiamento del desarrollo n. 112, luglio 2001. 
15 A. De  M e s a  –  H. He r n a n d e z  Sá n c h ez , “ An á l is is ,  evolución y propuestas de ampliación de la 
cobertura del sistema civil de pensiones en Chile”, OIT, 2001.   13
On a whole contribution equivalent to the 13.03%, 2.34% (or the 17.94% of the total 
payment) is due to the administration expenses.  
Finally, it was revealed an oligoplisitc concentration trend of the market: the three 
greater AFPs concentrate the 70.7% of the hoarded reserves, for an amount equivalent 




4.  Population trend and occupational structure 
 
In this section, we analyze the main demographic trends, in particular for what 
concernes the active population (people older  than 15 years).  
 
Table 2 






15 years  
Labour force  Employed   Unemployed   Inactive 
1989 Dec-Feb  8.899,28 4.671,31 4.317,03  354,28 4.227,96 
1990 Dec-Feb  9.077,77 4.839,98 4.512,19  327,78 4.237,79 
1991 Dec-Feb  9.253,90 4.914,47 4.552,21  362,25 4.339,43 
1992 Dec-Feb  9.427,32 5.039,43 4.704,84  334,59 4.387,88 
1993 Dec-Feb  9.602,96 5.275,90 4.950,62  325,28 4.327,05 
1994 Dec-Feb  9.777,66 5.526,04 5.136,45  389,59 4.251,62 
1995 Dec-Feb  9.948,21 5.582,06 5.177,17  404,88 4.366,15 
1996 Dec-Feb 10.122,03  5.584,60  5.196,11  388,48  4.537,43 
1997 Dec-Feb 10.298,40  5.596,61  5.292,14  304,47  4.701,80 
1998 Dec-Feb 10.470,92  5.667,65  5.377,36  290,29  4.803,27 
1999 Dec-Feb 10.642,29  5.795,86  5.361,41  434,45  4.846,43 
2000 Dec-Feb 10.810,55  5.883,43  5.409,90  473,53  4.927,13 
2001 Dec-Feb 10.993,43  5.820,06  5.331,59  488,47  5.173,36 
2002 Dec-Feb 11.186,03  5.910,01  5.417,96  492,05  5.276,02 
2003 Dec-Feb 11.377,98  6.024,95  5.551,22  473,73  5.353,03 
2004 Dec-Feb 11.567,27  6.120,52  5.665,44  455,08  5.446,75 
2005 Dec-Feb 11.754,68  6.328,10  5.845,52  482,58  5.426,58 
Source: INE (Istituto Nacional de Estadísticas). 
 
The Table 2 reports the data referred to the years 1989-2004, which show the 
population trend and, contextually, the evolution of the labour force’s and the employed 
people’s quotas. Despite a growing population, the share of the unemployed people 
remains quite stable, with a fall trend, while employed people quota rises.  
                                                 
16 V. C. Pinheiro, “20 años de reforma de la Seguridad Social en Chile”, 
http://www.redsegsoc.org.uy/Vinicius-Chile.PDF, novembre 2001.   14
Even the percent of inactive people is particularly steady: in 1986 it was 47.5% and in 
2003 it was is 47.5% (with a slight decline in the middle period: it was 47.5% in 1995). 
These figures highlight that there is a constant share of working people, or an 
unchanging ratio between working people and inactive people, which grants to the 
country a generational labour turnover.  
The stability of the time series reflects the image of a country which, as far as its 
employment rates are concerned, didn’t suffer neither the Mexican crisis of 1994, or the 
Asiatic one in 1997. 
Anyway, an in-depth study of the unemployment rate suggests some remarks: if in 1989 
unemployment was a phenomenon which involved only the 7.6% of the whole of the 
population, in 2002, despite an economic growth that projected Chile on the 
















































































Source: Our elaboration on INE (Istituto Nacional de Estadísticas) data. 
 
This data set inspires some inevitable questions about how the opportunities deriving 
from the economic development of Chile were managed and this is one of the issues that  
we consider in the next section of the present working paper, supposing that it may 
have conditioned the subsequent results in terms of poverty and income distribution. 
Deepening our definition of the Chilean occupational context, by the following data 
emerges that even in Chile it occurred the expansion of the tertiary industry which, in 
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Table 3 






















Feb 4.317,03  875,98  85,37 675,03  26,43 289,48  760,55 300,44  191,89  1.111,13 
1990 
Dec-
Feb 4.512,19  897,92  103,19 748,12  23,36 296,93  774,17 325,23  197,88  1.145,22 
1991 
Dec-
Feb 4.552,21  900,84  100,82 722,04  25,59 297,75  810,77 326,17  214,17  1.152,09 
1992 
Dec-
Feb 4.704,84  918,97  88,40 784,63  24,19 337,91  819,34 325,31  234,90  1.170,03 
1993 
Dec-
Feb 4.950,62  906,52  84,41 830,83  29,71 366,67  892,31 360,49  257,26  1.220,05 
1994 
Dec-
Feb 5.136,45  883,04  91,49 847,54  31,14 415,10  958,03 370,13  294,63  1.242,74 
1995 
Dec-
Feb 5.177,17  859,80  88,21 851,38  38,26 381,47  967,99 391,26  317,08  1.278,98 
1996 
Dec-
Feb 5.196,11  855,79  97,34 855,43  33,76 414,11  928,74 400,49  333,34  1.275,51 
1997 
Dec-
Feb 5.292,14  811,20  91,87 853,80  39,19 424,68  926,04 416,47  367,66  1.360,90 
1998 
Dec-
Feb  5.377,36 799,61  90,02 863,24  31,59 497,07  962,14 413,55  377,23  1.342,92 
1999 
Dec-
Feb 5.361,41  789,66  83,05 785,51  36,33 413,70  1.007,08  442,94 397,93  1.405,21 
2000 
Dec-
Feb 5.409,90  788,92  74,56 779,85  31,64 377,47  1.023,34  423,90 398,48  1.511,73 
2001 
Dec-
Feb 5.331,59  762,32  73,63 727,84  30,00 419,67  1.000,15  435,81 421,52  1.460,65 
2002 
Dec-
Feb 5.417,96  747,00  73,22 773,56  35,72 432,90  1.021,22  444,01 412,00  1.478,34 
2003 
Dec-




Feb 5.665,44  795,49  74,52  794,44  32,98 425,11  1.069,06  481,10 469,95  1.522,81 
2005 
Dic-
Feb 5.845,52    795,82   73,31   772,31   33,73   480,40   1.135,97   481,73   490,12   1.582,14  
Source: INE (Istituto Nacional de Estadísticas). 
 
Actually, against a decrease in the employment in those sectors that are traditionally 
strong for the Chilean economy (like the agriculture and mining industries) and a 
substantial stability in the number of the employed in the industrial sector, in the years 
between 1989 and 2003, there has been a relevant increase in the share of the 
employed individuals in sectors like communication, transports, and financial services. 
Finally, there are public and social services, whose workers increased, in confirmation of 
the centrality of the public sector in Chile’s economic and social structure.  
This brief analysis of the occupational survey in Chile in the last 15 years leads us to the 
last analysis, supposing that the mentioned stability of the unemployment rate and the 
subsequent, constant scarcity of the subordinate employment generated, in the Chilean 
population, a greater propensity to make itself responsible to the risk that could derive 
from self-employment.   16
Table 4 













1986  Dec-Feb  3.695,18 114,51  798,58  2.368,08 239,77  172,60 
1987  Dec-Feb  3.874,32 124,08  859,80  2.469,11 247,27  173,97 
1988  Dec-Feb  4.025,19 140,14  901,72  2.541,29 257,23  184,80 
1989  Dec-Feb  4.317,03 147,05  993,91  2.706,85 279,99  189,24 
1990  Dec-Feb  4.512,19 177,75 1.053,89 2.822,45 274,04  183,91 
1991  Dec-Feb  4.552,21 179,91 1.041,43 2.881,09 273,05  176,41 
1992  Dec-Feb  4.704,84 178,72 1.095,08 2.982,38 270,46  178,08 
1993  Dec-Feb  4.950,62 192,87 1.126,12 3.176,03 274,24  181,33 
1994  Dec-Feb  5.136,45 184,52 1.190,01 3.305,05 272,67  184,09 
1995  Dec-Feb  5.177,17 179,33 1.250,25 3.308,14 264,48  174,79 
1996  Dec-Feb  5.196,11 162,63 1.249,55 3.394,80 253,19  135,95 
1997  Dec-Feb  5.292,14 172,70 1.226,52 3.505,15 256,11  131,66 
1998  Dec-Feb  5.377,36   167,07   1238,24   3585,78   258,86  127,42 
1999  Dec-Feb  5.361,41 159,76 1.309,18 3.493,02 265,94  133,50 
2000  Dec-Feb  5.409,90 185,43 1.313,88 3.520,66 266,02  123,90 
2001  Dec-Feb  5.331,59 152,48 1.327,40 3.475,68 260,50  115,53 
2002  Dec-Feb  5.417,96 168,68 1.331,99 3.576,15 239,19  101,97 
2003  Dec-Feb  5.551,22 155,34 1.441,85 3.570,21 263,66  120,16 
2004  Dec-Feb  5.665,44   160,42   1.482,46   3.648,99   257,16   116,42  
2005  Dec-Feb  5.845,52   175,87   1.487,32   3.804,84   254,11   123,38  
 Source: INE (Istituto Nacional de Estadísticas). 
 
So, data seem to prove we are right. The role played by the Chilean population in the 
labour market, in fact, remained proportionally quite stable, except the extraordinary 
increase of the self-employed workers, whose raise was equivalent to the 44.6% (and 
the moderate growth of the dependent workers, who still represent the most numerous 
workers’ category at all).  
 
The picture of the situation shows a country whose occupational structure is still strongly 
based on the capacity of the public sector to absorb many workers and in which 
unemployment still represents a challenge to be faced.  
Meanwhile, we can even identify some changes for better and some signs of a deeper 
dynamism in the population choices (just like choosing a self-employment).  
During the period under observation, Chile went through two deep recessions. 
The first one, in 1975, was introduced by the severe oil shock which affected the 
international markets, involved heavy repercussions on the Chilean interchange and was 
probably amplified by the drastic trade liberalization enforced by the government on a 
country which perhaps still was unready.    17
In fact, in 1975, the Chilean government started an economic restoration programme 
whose first step provided a strong depreciation of the real exchange rate and a large 
reduction both of the monetary supply and of the public expenses.  
These measures certainly reduced inflation, but they also caused a considerable rise of 
unemployment (62,000 public sector workers were dismissed). Without reaching 
stability, in 1982 Chile was involved in the second, impressive economic crisis, due to an 
international debt crisis which caused a 14.1%GDP crash. During this second recession, 
the unemployment rate reached 19.6%, the highest level in the entire economic history 
of Chile. Unlike what occurred during the previous crisis, on this occasion the private 
sector workers were the most affected ones, though even in the public sector was 
registered the dismissal of 31,000 workers.  
 
In order to face the occupational emergency, the government had to implement several 
occupational programmes which remained in force both on ’70 and on ’80. 
Indeed, with the aim to compensate, at least partially, the social hardship derived from 
the unsureness of the occupational context, in 1975 the government implemented the 
first Emergency Employment Programme, the PEM (Programa de Empleo Mínimo), 
which, more than representing a long term oriented action, was founded on the direct 
negotiation between the State and some uneducated unemployed, with the twofold aim 
to create occupation and to facilitate the public works realization previded by the 
government by utilizing cheap labour force (salaries amounted to about 1/3 of the 
minimum wage).  
 
Table 5 
Source: for data from 1975 to 1985, INE and Ministry of the Interior; for data from 1985 
to 1988, INE “Compendio estadistico”.  
Workers employed in PEM and POJH 
1975-1988 
 
Year  PEM  POJH  PEM+POJH 
1975  72.695   -  72.695  
1976  157.836   -  157.836  
1977  187.647   -  187.647  
1978  145.792   -  145.792  
1979  133.933   -  133.933  
1980  190.763   -  190.763  
1981  175.607   -  175.607  
1982  225.290   81.200   306.490  
1983  341.578   161.228   502.806  
1984  170.915   207.639   378.554  
1985  105.646   171.360   277.006  
1986  61.410   122.812   184.222  
1987  22.245   64.201   86.446  
1988  3.521   5.345   8.866    18
The PEM incorporated almost 200,000 people each year during the second half of the ’70 
(the 6.7% of the employed population).Nevertheless, the unemployment rate rose till 
the end of the decade, with heavy repercussions on the income distribution, as will be 
discussed later
17.  
In that context, after the moderate improvement of the employment due to the PEM and 
owing to the  1982 recession, the government was compelled to introduce a new 
programme aimed to directly create employment.  
The programme, specifically addressed to the head of the families, was denominated 
POJH (Programa de Ocupación para Jefes de Hogar).  
The whole of the people involved in the PEM and in the POJH in 1982 amounted to 
306,490 and, in 1983, it reached the peak of 502,806. Since 1984, GDP progressively 
made it up and, since 1986, this recovery was associated to the employment increase. 
Actually, the PEM and the POJH held until 1988, as a proof of 13 years of occupational 
emergency. 
 
With respect to the salaries, during the first years, the government introduced a 
restrictive wage policy: the central authorities directly intervened in the process of the 
salary’s determination, whose amount and indexation were fixed and not seasonally 
adjusted.  
A drastic action like that was motivated by the fact that, in 1973, the inflation rate 
reached the 800% and it generated in the government the fear that a progressive salary 
adjustment would have further deteriorated the situation and reduced the effectiveness 
of the monetary and fiscal policies.  
So, the government proposed to reach an inflation rate equivalent to 100% in the 
following three years
18. In this way, since collective bargaining was prevented since 
1973, the wages trends, released from the market mechanism, further stiffened and, 
against a decreasing inflation, involved an high increase in the real wages between 1975 









                                                 
17 G. García-Huidobro, 2002. 
18  R. Cortazar, 1997.   19
Graph 2 









































































Source: Our elaboration on data INE (Istituto Nacional de Estadística). 
 
Indeed, as referred in the Graph 2, if we choose 1970 as a reference year, in 1975 we 
observe a drop to 62.5 and a subsequent, new increase until 97.1 in 1982. But when, 
after the 1982 crisis, wages were de-indexed, a new fall in real wages occurred: salaries 
decreased until 86.5 in 1983 and 83.2 in 1985. Purchasing power deteriorated and 
retrocede to the ’60 levels. Anyway, as from an initial wages level consistently reduced if 
compared to the 1970, during the years between 1975 and 1982, in Chile it occurred a 
singular co-existence between rising wages and high unemployment rate.  
 
 
2. The incidence of poverty 
 
In the last 15 years, the poverty of the Chilean population has been progressively 
reduced: thanks to a combination between economic growth and social programmes, 
poverty rate decreased more then 50% since 1990, while income distribution continues 
representing one of the hardest problems to be solved by the Chilean governments. 
Income distribution, indeed, in spite of Chile’s economic performance
19, remains stable 
and is still worst as regards as some similar countries







1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003




Source: Our elaboration on data MIDEPLAN. 
                                                 
19 J. A. Ocampo, 1998. 
20 R. A. Chumacero – R. Paredes M., 2002.   20
 
The data analysis furnishes proves to what has been maintained: if in 1990, poor people 
in Chile were equivalent to the 25.7% of the population, in 2003 they dropped to the 








  1990 1992 1994 1996  1998  2000  2003 
Indigent 
12.9 8.8 7.6 5.7  5.6 5.7  4.7 
Not Indigent Poor  
25.7 23.8 19.9 17.4  16.1 14.9  14.1 
Poor Total 
38.6 32.6 27.5 23.2  21.7 20.6  18.8 
Not Poor Total 
61.0 67.4 72.5 76.8  78.3 79.4  81.2 
Source: CASEN. 
 
As in table 6, the percentage of the whole not poor population increased from 61.0% in 
1990 to 81.2% in 2003, while the poor total quota showed a decrease of almost 20%, 
from 38.6% to 18.8%. 
But are there some population categories which are, more then others, affected by 
poverty? And, if so, why? In other terms, could we ever identify some criteria which are 
usually associated with poverty, in Chile’s economic and social context? 
In order to estimate the recurring typicalnesses in Chilean poor population, we 
introduced the variable “age”, with the aim to find out if it has some influence on the 
analyzed phenomenon. 
 
Data processed by MIDEPLAN (Ministry of Social Planning) highlight that, despite an 
undeniable dynamism expressed by the overall trend to the reduction of the percent of 
poor and indigent people, there is still an alarming and persistent issue: the modal value 
of the considered years distribution always corresponds to the younger age band (0-14), 
which is the most affected by poverty and indigence one. Both of these phenomena tend 
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Table 7 




Condition  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 
From 0 to 9 
Indigent  20.5 14.5 12.0  9.0  8.6  8.6  7.7 
Not Indigent Poor   31.8 31.7 27.5 24.6 22.4 20.4 19.6 
Poor Total  52.3 46.3 39.5 33.6 31.0 29.0 27.3 
Not Poor Total  47.7 53.8 60.5 66.4 69.0 71.0 72.7 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 10 to 19 
Indigent  16.4 11.5 10.1  7.6  7.5  7.6  6.5 
Not Indigent Poor  30.3 27.7 24.0 21.6 20.5 19.0 18.5 
Poor Total  46,7 39.2 34.1 29.2 28.0 26.6 25.1 
Not Poor Total  53.3 60.8 65.9 70.8 72.0 73.4 74.9 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 20 to 29 
Indigent  11.0  7.3 5.8 4.6 4.5 4.7 3.8 
Not Indigent Poor  24.2 23.5 18.6 15.2 13.7 13.1 11.8 
Poor Total  35.2 30.8 24.4 19.8 18.2 17.8 15.5 
Not Poor Total  64.8 69.2 75.6 80.2 81.8 82.2 84.5 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 30 to 39 
Indigent  19.2  9.7 7.8 5.5 5.5 5.5 4.3 
Not Indigent Poor  26.0 24.1 21.4 18.4 16.1 15.1 14.1 
Poor Total  38.9 33.8 29.2 23.9 21.6 20.6 18.4 
Not Poor Total  61.1 66.2 70.8 76.1 78.4 79.4 81.6 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 40 to 49 
Indigent  9.0 6.1 5.2 4.1 4.4 4.4 3.8 
Not Indigent Poor  22.4 19.4 15.7 14.2 13.7 12.7 11.9 
Poor Total  31.4 25.5 20.9 18.3 18.1 17.1 15.7 
Not Poor Total  68.6 74.5 79.1 81.7 81.9 82.9 84.3 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 50 to 59 
Indigent  7.5 4.4 4.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 2.9 
Not Indigent Poor  18.0 15.8 12.5 10.0  9.4  8.7  8.7 
Poor Total  25.5 20.2 17.0 13.4 12.7 12.2 11.6 
Not Poor Total  74.5 79.8 83.0 86.6 87.3 87.8 88.4 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
From 60 to 69 
Indigent  5.4 3.5 3.1 2.8 3.2 2.1 2.2 
Not Indigent Poor  16.0 13.8 11.7  8.9  8.5  7.1  8.9 
Poor Total  21.4 17.3 14.8 11.8 11.8  9.2  11.1 
Not Poor Total  78.6 82.7 85.2 88.2 88.2 90.8 88.9 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Over 70 
Indigent  3.9 2.6 2.9 1.7 1.5 0.9 1.0 
Not Indigent Poor  15.6 12.1 11.5  8.3  8.5  5.5  7.4 
Poor Total  19.5 14.6 14.4 10.0 10.0  6.4  8.4 
Not Poor Total  80.5 85.4 85.6 90.0 90.0 93.6 91.6 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
National Total 
Indigent  13.0  9.1 7.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 4.7 
Not Indigent Poor  25.6 23.8 20.1 17.4 16.1 14.6 14.0 
Poor Total  38.6 32.9 27.7 23.2 21.7 20.2 18.7 
Not Poor Total  61.4 67.1 72.3 76.8 78.3 79.8 81.3 
TOTAL  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: our elaboration on MIDEPLAN data.  
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Indeed, against an increase of 24.5% on the entire “non-poor” population between 1987 
and 2000, population between 0 and 14 years continues being the poorest and 
characterizing itself as the weakest one. 
These young people mostly belong to numerous and poor families, they often are 
uneducated and they have tiring and badly remunerated jobs. Unfortunately, until now 
the governments didn’t provide to improve this category’s conditions by drawing up a 
specific programme: this is one of the main reasons why, during these last years, there 
wasn’t a change for the better in the younger population conditions.  
As the age increases, in all of the considered years, we notice a reduction in the poor 
and indigent population quota, perhaps due to the fact that they reach the working age 
and the right to be on the dole.  
Table 8 




GENDER CONDITION    1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 
Indigent 
12.7  8.9 7.4 5.7 5.5 5.4 4.5 
Not Indigent Poor  
25.2 23.4 19.8 17.2 16.0 14.6 13.8 
Poor Total 
37.9 32.3 27.2 22.9 21.5 20.0 18.3 
Male  
 
Not Indigent Poor 
62.1 67.7 72.8 77.1 78.5 80.0 81.7 
Total   100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Indigent 
13.3  9.2 7.8 5.8 5.8 5.7 4.8 
Not Indigent Poor 
26.0 24.2 20.4 17.7 16.1 14.7 14.2 
Poor Total 
39.3 33.4 28.2 23.5 21.9 20.4 19.0 
Female  
 
Not Indigent Poor 
60.7 66.6 71.8 76.5 78.1 79.6 81.0 
Total   100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: our elaboration on MIDEPLAN data.  
 
In order to get to a better comprehension of the occupational trends, we also tried to 
verify if education affected the chances to be employed, as it was predictable, and, via 
employment, on escaping poverty. 
Anyway, in the Chilean case, the educational component doesn’t seem to have played an 
important role on the well-being of all the working population.  
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Table 9 
Average years of education of population over 15 
(Percent values) 
 
CONDITION  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 
Indigent  7,2  7,5  7,2  7,1  7,2  7,9  8,3 
Not Indigent Poor   7,9  8,0  7,7  7,8  8,0  8,4  8,5 
Not Poor  9,7  9,5  9,7  9,9  10,1  10,1  10,5 
TOTAL 9,0  9,0  9,2  9,5  9,7  9,8  10,2 
Source: MIDEPLAN. 
 
The MIDEPLAN survey shows two interesting elements: firstly, the fact that, in the last 
13 years, the average values of the Chilean population school attendance highlight a 
modest but steady rise and secondly, that, among indigent and “non-poor” population, 
the difference in terms of school attendance constantly corresponds to about two years.   
By introducing a further variable, the unemployment rate, emerges that the occupational 
issue actually influenced the poverty level of the Chilean population. 
 
 
5.  The income distribution trend 
 
As we said before, the income distribution issue continues being the most problematic 
one. But which are the reasons? Ruiz-Tagle
21 points out that the chilean experience 
wasn’t always characterized by high levels of inequality of the income distribution: for 
instance, the aggregate demand expansion and the income redistribution policies during 
the Allende government (1970-1973) contributed to a reduction both on the income 
distribution inequality and on the unemployment rate.
22 
The structural reforms introduced by the Pinochet’s government (which were based on 
the commercial openness, on the subsidiary role of the State and on the use of the 
market mechanisms rules in order to attribute the country’s resources
23) allowed the 
country to achieve good macroeconomic results (in particular, on the long run), but they 
were less successful in improving the income distribution. 
As shown in the first section of this paper, the price stabilization policy carried out by the 
government was one of the causes that brought to the 1975 recession, followed, 
between 1977 and 1981, by a phase of economic development based on the foreign 
debt accumulation, which, on the long term, proved itself to be unsustainable and 
originated the 1982 crisis.  
                                                 
21 Ruiz-Tagle, J., 1999.  
22 O. Larrañaga J., 2001. 
23 O. Larrañaga, 1999.   24
The influence on the income distribution generated an higher inequality, expressed by a 
10% rise in the Gini’s indicator between 1974 and 1980. 
The factors which, among the others, could be related to the worsening of the 
distribution level during the first years of the Pinochet’s government are various. One of 
them is the unemployment increase, even caused by the employment reduction in the 
public sector and by the recessionary impact of the prices stabilization. 
During the years that followed to the foreign debt crisis in 1982, the inequality reached 
the higher levels on the entire statistic series (1970-2000), due to the rise of the 
unemployment rate, the plunge in income and in production and the drastic contraction 
of the welfare. 
During the next period (1987 – 1990), inequality continued showing high levels, despite 
the economic and occupational recovery. 
As from 1991 and until 1998 (when it occurred the Asian crisis) the Chilean economy 
experimented an high GDP increase stage, which allowed a rise in the social 
expenditure, with the intention of combining the economic growth with the income 
distribution equity. 
By analyzing the inequality trend during the considered period, we can observe an   
inverted parabola: income inequality decreased until 1992-3 and then it increased again, 
reaching a level which is similar to the one observed at the beginning of the decade. In 
1998, in fact, the 10% of population’s income was 38 times the one perceived by the 
10% poorest one and about the 70% of population perceived an income which was 
lower with respect to the average national value.
24 
Anyway, we should draw attention to the fact that, excluding the pension system, which 
actually doesn’t reallocate income, the most of the social welfare in Chile is focused on 
the concession of social services like the support of education, the sanitary subsidies and 
the facilitated access to the State houses.  
Obviously, these issues are of primary importance for the well-being of population; 
nevertheless, they aren’t usually incorporated into the traditional income distribution 
measurements. Consequently, the statistics related to the income distribution generally 
don’t reflect the impact of these distributive policies, though the social program 
expenditure, expressed in 1998 pesos, rose from 4.486 pesos per capita in 1990 to 
10.225 in 1998. So, trying to adjust the statistics on the basis of the distributive impact 
of social expenditure,
25 in the period 1987-1998 there is an effective improvement in the 
income distribution, even if the policies the government carried out were orientated 
more on the poverty reduction than on the reduction of the inequalities in itself. 
Furthermore, in the three years from 1999 to 2001, it occurred both a slowdown in the 
growth trends and a sudden increase in unemployment, due to the Asiatic crisis in 1998. 
                                                 
24 FIDA, 2002. 
25 D. Bravo - D. Contreras - I. Millan, 2001.   25
During these years, the income inequality remained quite steady, even if it was similiar 
to the one observed at the end of the ’80.  Income inequality in Chile is still higher with 
respect to the international standards. Several researches suggest that Chile’s income 
distribution is one of the worse in the world,
26 though there was a rapid poverty 
reduction, good economic performances, institutional programmes aimed to help the 
poorest citizens and an educational system which was continuously improved.  
A deeper analysis of the data on income distribution can be carried out by taking as a 
reference the families subdivided by decreasing income quintiles. 
Using that parameter, the clearest gap among contiguous groups is the one between the 
fifth quintile (richest families) and the forth one and this is one of the most peculiar 
characteristic of the income distribution in the whole Latin America. 
27 
The other ratios show very similar levels, except for the one between the second and the 
first quintile, that represents the demarcation line between poverty and indigence: data 
highlight that the second quintile perceives an income which is twice the one at the first 
one’s disposal. 
We used data elaborated by the CASEN surveys
28 related to the main dimension we 
covered in this paper: starting from a general overview of the average work income, in 
fact, we then analysed the income distribution by considering the source of income, the 
previsional coverage and the signing of a contract, in order to verify the impact of the 
Pinochet’s government reforms on the distributional issue. 
The analysis of the variable “average work income” confirms the previous observations.  
Indeed, in spite of the economic growth which contributed to the general increase of the 
wages, the first quintile’s income is 8 times lower with respect to the fifth one’s. 
 
Table 10 
AVERAGE WORK INCOME 
(Thousand Pesos) 
 
  1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 
 
QUINTILE 5  202,6 325,1 432,2 534,6 662,8 726,5 765,1 
QUINTILE 4  65,5 101,1 134,1 180,3 216,4 228,5 243,0 
QUINTILE 3  46,7  71,0  96,0 120,6 145,5 161,0 170,1 
QUINTILE 2  37,9 56,3 73,3 92,4 10,4  121,7  131,9 
QUINTILE 1  26,1 40,7 52,4 63,1 78,1 85,8 92,6 
 
Q5/Q1  7,76 7,98 8,24 8,47 8,48 8,46 8,26 
Source: Our elaboration on data CASEN. 
 
If the poorest families’ average income amounts to 92,6 thousand pesos in 2003, the 
richest ones’ is equivalent to 765,1 thousand pesos. 
                                                 
26 World Bank, 1997 e 2000. 
27 BID, 1999. 
28 CASEN surveys are carried out by the Ministry of Social Planining (MIDEPLAN).   26
Even as regards this variable, the deeper gap is the one between the fifth and the forth 
quintile. 
In this connection, almost the 65% of the families’ income derives from the main 
occupation, while the remaining 35% comes from other revenues, included the ones 
which arise from the second job (these correspond to the 4% of the total income of the 
families). Even in this case, we can notice the strong discrepancy among the various 
income levels: the first quintile is equivalent to about 1/16 of the fifth one. 
 
Table 11 
Distribution of the Households’ Income 
Source of income 
(Percent values) 
 
      QUINTILE 1  QUINTILE 2  QUINTILE 3  QUINTILE 4  QUINTILE 5  TOTAL 
Autonomous 
Income 
4,1 8,1  12,3  18,1  57,4  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
33,7 23,8 18,5 13,8  10,2  100,0  1990 
Monetary 
Income 
4,4 8,2  12,3  18,1  57,0  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
4,3 8,3  12,2  18,6  56,6  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
36,6 26,3 17,7 12,0  7,4  100,0  1992 
Monetary 
Income 
4,6 8,5  12,2  18,5  56,2  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
4,1 8,1  11,9  18,7  57,2  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
38,8 26,1 17,3 12,1  5,7  100,0  1994 
Monetary 
Income 
4,5 8,5  12,3  19,2  55,5  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
3,9 8,0  11,7  19,2  57,2  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
36,2 27,7 20,5 11,5  4,1  100,0  1996 
Monetary 
Income 
4,2 8,2  11,8  19,1  56,7  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
3,7 8,0  11,7  19,2  57,4  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
46,2 26,5 15,9  8,5  2,9  100,0  1998 
Monetary 
Income 
4,1 8,2  11,7  19,1  56,9  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
3,9 8,2  12,0  18,4  57,6  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
37,0 27,3 19,5 13,3  2,9  100,0  2000 
Monetary 
Income 
4,2 8,3  12,1  18,3  57,1  100,0 
Autonomous 
Income 
3,9 8,3  12,0  18,9  56,8  100,0 
Monetary 
Subsidies 
46,7 25,7 15,7  8,8  3,1  100,0  2003 
Monetary 
Income 
4,4 8,5  12,1  18,8  56,3 
     
100,0  
Source: Our elaboration on data Casen. 
 
Furthermore, we can see from table 11 that, obviously, the higher percentage of the 
autonomous income is always the one represented by the quintile 5, and the lowest is   27
the one referred to the quintile 1 (the same trend of the monetary income, while the 
opposite happens when we observe the monetary subsidies). 
With the aim to verify whether the previsional reform affected the income distribution, 
we also compared the households’ income distribution by dividing the households 
between the ones with a previsional coverage and the ones without it. 
 
Table 12 
Distribution of the Households’ Income 
Previsional Coverage 
(Percent values)  
  
    QUINTILE 1  QUINTILE 2  QUINTILE 3  QUINTILE 4  QUINTILE 5  TOTAL 
Yes  30.680 41.679 49.661 67.347  201.498  89.773 
No  21.111 31.864 41.660 61.400  205.281  68.737 
N.a.  25.612 36.743 39.303 64.173  205.723  87.052 
1990 
Total  26.130 37.861 46.697 65.510  202.573  82.643 
Yes  46.197 60.861 73.645  103.182  304.758  130.116 
No  34.531 49.308 66.589 96.651  365.953  119.025 
N.a.  39.095 54.899 71.346  109.321  362.235  150.792 
1992 
Total  40.690 56.301 71.013  101.110  325.083  126.594 
Yes  61.160  80.710  104.033 139.598 407.161  181.761 
No  42.933 61.809 81.361  121.146  501.166  153.148 
N.a.  , 46.889 ,  ,  118.653  116.586 
1994 
Total  52.395 73.324 96.024  134.066  432.208  171.852 
Yes  72.484  100.330 128.255 183.498 531.382  231.047 
No  52.708  79.114  105.086 173.585 537.064  188.947 
N.a.  49.978  103.260 139.081 163.252 876.915  348.814 
1996 
Total  63.147  92.373  120.626 180.282 534.630  216.891 
Yes  89.311  119.923 152.829 217.663 665.341  285.241 
No  66.293  94.603  131.784 213.735 649.115  225.363 
N.a.  99.648  114.268 120.163 194.173  1.346.544  492.284 
1998 
Total  78.061  110.444 145.534 216.366 662.835  265.013 
Yes  89.311  119.923 152.829 217.663 665.341  285.241 
No  66.293  94.603  131.784 213.735 649.115  225.363 
N.a.  99.648  114.268 120.163 194.173  1.346.544  492.284 
2000 
Total  78.061  110.444 145.534 216.366 662.835  265.013 
Yes  110.002 144.478 178.309 251.124 789.811  340.062 
No  74.272  112.163 155.366 224.261 701.043  247.730 
N.a.  92.120  117.240 157.193 251.129 756.558  281.211 
2003 
Total  92.612  131.919 170.076 243.025 765.106  307.749 
Source: Our elaboration on data Casen. 
 
We can see that, in the first quintile, the number of the ones who have a previsional 
coverage grew by 366,7% (a very similiar percentage, 377,6%, was observed in the 
fifth quintile). We can’t also ignore that, while in the first quintile the volume of the 
income referred to the ones that have a previsional coverage always exceeds the one of 
who don’t have it, it’s exactly the opposite in the fifth quintile, where, since 1996, the 
income of people who didn’t have a previsional coverage was higher.   28
In conclusion of this last section, we analysed the distributional trend of the chileans’ 
income according to the signing of a contract. 
 
Table 13 
Distribution of the Households’ Income 
Contract 
(Percent values)   
  
      QUINTILE 1  QUINTILE 2  QUINTILE 3  QUINTILE 4  QUINTILE 5  TOTAL 
Yes      29.838       40.133       47.668       65.437     159.817       73.266  
No      22.374       29.590       34.052       44.519     105.565       40.183  
N.a.      27.327       32.432       41.720       49.673     125.014       57.787  
1990 
Total      27.768       37.886       45.320       62.555     154.416       67.599  
Yes      44.049       58.002       70.334       97.118     229.675     101.988  
No      33.807       42.495       49.658       69.148     117.792       52.450  
N.a.      39.822       59.527       71.908     115.307     490.267     277.531  
1992 
Total      41.685       55.285       67.265       94.201     230.509       96.889  
Yes      61.160       80.710     104.033     139.598     407.161     181.761  
No      42.933       61.809       81.361     121.146     501.166     153.148  
N.a.   ,       46.889    ,    ,     118.653     116.586  
1994 
Total      52.395       73.324       96.024     134.066     432.208     171.852  
Yes      72.116       98.636     126.255     175.796     392.860     185.214  
No      51.843       69.817       81.774     108.627     256.860       93.753  
N.a.      66.712       79.624       94.138     121.032     264.206     111.647  
1996 
Total      64.421       90.293     116.896     164.046     375.343     164.042  
Yes      89.413     118.301     149.061     206.829     504.089     230.506  
No      62.801       80.606       98.283     138.223     285.122     108.541  
N.a.      69.932       96.959     122.065     151.685     351.044     135.195  
1998 
Total      77.677     107.089     137.558     194.807     478.148     201.096  
Yes      89.413     118.301     149.061     206.829     504.089     230.506  
No      62.801       80.606       98.283     138.223     285.122     108.541  
N.a.      69.932       96.959     122.065     151.685     351.044     135.195  
2000 
Total      77.677     107.089     137.558     194.807     478.148     201.096  
Yes    110.158     142.141     170.758     237.511     580.057     268.495  
No      70.315       98.043     114.249     145.761     323.312     125.670  
N.a.      96.214     116.040     145.066     154.974     433.752     171.336  
2003 
Total      94.413     129.504     158.701     222.042     550.778     236.489  
Source: Our elaboration on data Casen. 
 
Besides noticing the enormous disproportion between the fifth and the first quintile in 
signing a contract, which ratio, anyway, decreased along years from 6,57 to 5,26, we 
must also underline one point: that also the ratio inside the first quintile between the 
ones who didn’t sign a contract and the ones who did decreased from 0,75 in 1990 to 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
 
According to Joseph Stigliz, the structural reforms carried out in Latin America on the 
basis of the Chilean model increased the countries’ exposure to grave economic risks, 
without providing them with the means to face the situation and giving impulse to a 
privatization programme to the detriment of the public sector.
29  
Data showed that, under the profile of poverty structure, even though the overall 
situation is changing for better, 18.8% of population in 2003 still was poor. For what 
concernes the income distribution, the labour market and the social security system 
reforms seem to have shown a persistent effect on the population’s capacity to break 
the schemes of a deep gap between the first quintile and the fifth one. 
For the future, according to what is provided by J. Ruiz-Tagle, “given the moderate 
earnings, the coverage gap and the low level of the active payments, the majority of the 
contributors probably won’t be able to amass the fund necessary in order to finance the 
minimum pension and will have to apply for a complementary support by the State”
30.  
Therefore, by means of adequate policies, it would be necessary that a new equilibrium 
between the State and the market would be restored, so to facilitate the creation of new 
firms, rather than privatizing the existing ones.   
Only this equilibrium, based on the synergy between the State and the market and 
aimed to the poverty and the income distribution inequality reduction, could enable the 





















                                                 
29 J. E. Stiglitz, 2003. 
30 J. Ruiz-Tagle, 2000.   30
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